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A caricature can reveal an aspect of its subject that a more faithful representation 
would fail to render: by depicting a slow and clumsy person as a monkey one can 
point out such qualities of the depicted subject, and by depicting a person with quite 
big ears as a person with enormous ears one can point out that the depicted person 
has rather big ears. How can a form of representation that is by definition inaccurate 
be so representationally powerful? Figurative language raises a similar puzzle. Met-
aphors, taken at face value, are usually false: men are not wolves. The same goes for 
hyperbolic talk: Putnam did not change his position one billion times in his career. 
Still, figurative language is expressively powerful: by saying that human beings are 
wolves or that Putnam changed his position one billion times in his career one con-
veys, in a very vivid way, some true information about the world (something con-
cerning the facts that human beings are cruel and that Putnam frequently changed 
opinion). Kendall Walton (1993) provides an elegant explanation of the expressive 
utility of figurative language by linking metaphor and prop oriented make- believe. 
We explore the hypothesis that the theory of prop oriented make- believe can also 
explain the representational efficacy of caricatures.
Caricatures pose a puzzle. On the one hand, by their nature, they misrep-  resent their subjects to some extent. On the other hand, they seem to be 
effective representational aids: a caricature can sometimes reveal an aspect of 
its subject that a more faithful representation would fail to render. How is this 
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possible? How can a form of representation that is by definition inaccurate be so 
representationally powerful?
This paper brings together two ideas. First, the puzzle raised by caricatures 
somehow resembles the puzzle raised by figurative language. Metaphors, taken 
at face value, are usually false: men are not wolves. The same goes for hyperbolic 
talk: Putnam did not change his position one billion times in his career. Still, 
figurative language is expressively powerful: by saying that human beings are 
wolves or that Putnam changed his position one billion times in his career one 
conveys, in a very vivid way, some true information about the world (something 
concerning the facts that human beings are cruel and that Putnam frequently 
changed opinion).1
Our second idea stems from the observation that Kendall Walton’s theory of 
make- believe (1973; 1990; 1993) is at the same time an account of the phenom-
enon of depiction and other forms of representation and an account of figurative 
language, especially metaphor, as prop oriented make- believe. This suggests the 
possibility of treating caricatures in analogy with figurative language. And this 
is the suggestion we are going to explore.
We proceed as follows: in Section 1 we sum up the kernel of Walton’s theo-
ry of make- believe and introduce his distinction between content oriented and 
prop oriented make- believe; in Section 2 we argue that Walton’s account applies 
to depicted metaphors; in Section 3 we argue that some caricatures are a kind 
of depicted metaphors, whose workings are illuminated by the make- believe 
theory; in Section 4 we argue that the make- believe theory also explains how 
caricatures that are like hyperboles work; Section 5 concludes.
1.
What is a game of make- believe? In a game of make- believe we pretend that 
something is the case. Games are rule- governed activities, and the rules govern-
ing games of make- believe are called ‘principles of generation’. A principle of 
generation specifies what is to be imagined to be the case (i.e., the contents of 
the game of make- believe) as a function of what really is the case (i.e., the props 
of the game of make- believe). The general scheme can be expressed as follows:
G iff according to the fiction F
1. Both nelson Goodman (1968) and Stephanie ross (1974) have noticed the resemblance 
between caricatures and metaphors, although they haven’t elaborated much on this point. noël 
Carroll (2003) has put forward an account of visual metaphors which— it seems to us— could be 
applied to caricatures.
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where G stands for what is really the case, and F stands for what is fictionally the 
case. For instance, here is a game of make- believe governed by two principles of 
generation (see liggins 2014: 603):
(PG1) x is wearing a funny hat iff according to the fiction x is the King of 
France
(PG2) x is lying on the floor iff according to the fiction x is injured
(PG1 + PG2) The man with the funny hat is lying on the floor iff accord-
ing to the fiction the King of France is injured.
Principles of generation link what is the case (the props) with what is to be 
imagined to be the case (the contents). normally, the point of a game of make 
believe is to engage in certain imaginative activities. When children pretend that 
pieces of mud are pies or when we pretend that what we read in a novel is re-
ally the case, the focus of our attention is on the fictional truths generated by the 
principles of generation. Participants in a game of make- believe typically adapt 
their behavior to what is to be imagined to be the case, i.e., the game’s content. 
This is what happens in what Walton (1990) calls ‘content oriented games of 
make- believe’.
Principles of generation, however, are a two- way road. This is particularly 
clear in our formulation, in which they are bi- conditionals:
(PG) G iff according to the fiction F.
PG demands participants to the game of make- believe to imagine that F, on con-
dition that G. But PG also tells us that G must be really the case, if F is to be 
imagined to be the case. This shows how knowledge of the game contents deliv-
ers information about the real world, i.e., about the props. In our toy example, by 
knowing that it is fictionally true that the King of France is injured we know that 
is true simpliciter that the man with the funny hat is lying on the floor.
The point of pretending that F as a move in a game of make- believe regu-
lated by PG might in principle be to draw our attention to G, the real world fact 
that makes F pretense- worthy. In particular, if a principle of generation takes 
the form ‘p iff according to the pretense q’ then someone who says that q within 
the pretense can communicate that it is the case that p in the real world (see 
liggins 2014: 603). When games of make- believe are used in this way, we are 
dealing with what Walton (1993) calls ‘prop oriented games of make- believe’; 
such games might be also called world oriented (see Yablo 2005), given that the 
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props belong to the real (as opposed to the fictional) world.2 Walton gives some 
examples of prop oriented games of make- believe:
Where in Italy is the town of Crotone? I ask. You explain that it is on the 
arch of the Italian boot. ‘See that thundercloud over there – the big, angry 
face near the horizon,’ you say; ‘it is headed this way.’ . . . We speak of the 
saddle of a mountain and the shoulder of a highway.
All of these cases are linked to make- believe. We think of Italy and the 
thundercloud as something like pictures. Italy (or a map of Italy) depicts 
a boot. The cloud is a prop which makes it fictional that there is an angry 
face. . . . The saddle of a mountain is, fictionally, a horse’s saddle. But 
our interest, in these instances, is not in the make- believe itself, and it 
is not for the sake of games of make- believe that we regard these things 
as props. . . . [The make- believe] is useful for articulating, remembering, 
and communicating facts about the props – about the geography of Italy, 
or the identity of the storm cloud . . . or mountain topography. It is by 
thinking of Italy or the thundercloud . . . as potential if not actual props 
that I understand where Crotone is, which cloud is the one being talked 
about. (1993: 40– 41)
‘Crotone is on the arch of the Italian boot’ likens the Italian peninsula to a 
boot. This metaphorical statement introduces a game of prop oriented make- 
believe because it engages us in a game of make- believe where we pretend that 
the Italian peninsula, with its peculiar geography (the prop), is a boot (that Cro-
tone is on the arch of the Italian boot is then the content of the game) and, in virtue 
of this, it conveys useful information as to where in Italy Crotone is located. 
While engaging in this game we are not interested in imagining a story where 
we pretend that the Italian peninsula is a boot (content orientation), but we are 
interested in finding out a fact about the real world, i.e., where exactly Crotone 
is located in the Italian peninsula (prop orientation).
2.
When discussing prop oriented games of make- believe Walton explains that his 
“general idea is this: the metaphorical statement [‘Crotone is on the arch of the 
2. In reply to a question raised by a referee, it might be worth noticing that there is no way 
to tell whether a game of make- believe is prop or content oriented by just looking at its principles 
of generation. The logical structure of the principles is the same in both cases (a bi- conditional). 
rather, the difference between prop and content oriented games of make- believe lies in the way 
the principles of generation are used by those who play the relevant game of make- believe.
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Italian boot’] . . . implies or introduces or calls to mind a (possible) game of 
make- believe” (1993: 74) in which we imagine “a boot, while seeing a map of 
Italy” (1993: 66). This make- believe “is useful for articulating, remembering, and 
communicating facts about the props – about the geography of Italy” (1993: 41) 
and is thus prop oriented. We can paraphrase this passage in the following way: 
in the case of linguistic metaphors, the sentence ‘Crotone is on the arch of the 
Italian boot’ is uttered or written down and this triggers a certain prop oriented 
game of make- believe. It is worth noticing that this is possible only because, 
thanks to the rules of English, the relevant sentence- token expresses a content, 
i.e., the proposition that Crotone is on the arch of the Italian boot. Hence, in the 
case of linguistic metaphors, three key elements are involved: (1) the sentence- 
token p (which we will call ‘the trigger’) expresses (2) the proposition that p (the 
Figure 1.
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content) which is true according to the fiction G on condition that (3) the real- 
world fact G (the prop) obtains.
Our proposal can be presented as a generalization of Walton’s account. Our 
main point is that uttering a metaphorical statement might be one way to launch 
a metaphorical game of make- believe, but it need not be the only one. There 
might be other triggers beyond sentence tokens. Another way to invite someone 
to see Italy as a boot is to actually depict Italy as a boot, as in Figure 1.3
remember how things worked in the case of the linguistic metaphor. The 
trigger in that case was a sentence token, which, in the case of written sentences, 
is a series of marks on a surface.4 Thanks to a certain mechanism— the rules of 
English— the sentence- token generates a proposition, which is the content of a 
prop oriented game of make- believe. In the case of the depicted metaphor we 
also start with marks on a surface; only, this time, instead of a sentence- token we 
have a picture. The marks on a surface that constitute the picture generate not 
a proposition, but a depictive content. This depictive content is, in our model, 
the counterpart of the propositional content generated by the sentence ‘Crotone 
is on the arch of the Italian boot’: in so far as it makes sense to compare propo-
sitional and non- propositional content, we can say that the picture and the sen-
tence both ‘represent’ Italy as a boot.5 The depictive content of the picture, then, 
becomes the content of a second game of make- believe we engage in, a prop 
oriented game, where the prop is the same as in Walton’s example: the Italian 
peninsula, with its peculiar geography. Both in the linguistic and in the pictorial 
case of prop oriented make- believe we are not interested in the fictional world 
in which Italy is a boot, but in the real world condition that makes it pretense- 
worthy that Italy is a boot, i.e., that Italy has a certain geography.
In the linguistic case, the proposition expressed by the sentence token is de-
termined by the rules of English. How is depictive content generated? A way to 
answer this question consists in following Walton’s view (1973; 1990), according 
to which the role played by the rules of English in the linguistic case is played in 
the pictorial case by a game of make of make believe. Various forms of represen-
tation are based on make- believe, Walton argues, and this includes pictorial rep-
resentations. Pictures, Walton argues, can be “regard[ed] . . . as props in games 
of make- believe” (1973: 300) where one imagines oneself seeing certain scenes 
in the picture- world so that, for instance, “The colors and shapes on the surface 
3. Our claim is consistent with the account of visual metaphors provided by noël Carroll 
(2003).
4. We focus on the case where the sentence is written down rather than uttered just to stress 
the analogy with the depictive case. nothing important hinges on that.
5. The point of comparing depictive and propositional content is just to understand that they 
play similar roles in our model, not to put forward an account of the relation between proposi-
tional and depictive content.
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of [Brueghel’s] Haymaking make it the case that *the peasants are working hard* 
(MB)” and that “I *look at peasants* (MB)” (Walton 1973: 300, 302). In the case 
of the depicted metaphor, then, the marks and colors on a pictorial surface are 
triggers of a prop oriented make- believe game (the usual one in which Italy is 
the prop), but they work as triggers because they generate a pictorial content, 
and they generate such content by being the props in a content oriented game of 
make- believe: the one that generates the content that I look at Italy, which is a 
boot with Crotone on its arch.
In what follows, we shall partly depart from Walton’s view on depiction, 
dropping the idea that the visual experience of the subject is part of the content 
of the pictorial game of make- believe. This, as we shall see, allows us to keep 
our model as simple as possible. Even the choice of using Walton’s make- believe 
theory to explain how pictorial content is generated is not essential to our ac-
count. Any mechanism for the generation of pictorial content would do. The 
central idea we wish to borrow from Walton is exclusively his account of prop 
oriented make- believe.6
let us now introduce our proposal with the following diagram (Figure 2):
The first arrow from the left indicates how the picture generates its depictive 
content: namely, through the mechanism of pictorial representation, which in-
volves, in Walton’s account, a content oriented game of make- believe (MB1, also 
6. Thanks to a referee from this journal for helping us to clarify this point.
Figure 2.
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labeled ‘depiction’, given that MB1 is the mechanism generating depictive con-
tent). This content is what we are to imagine to be the case: that Italy is a boot 
and Crotone is on the arch of the Italian boot. The props of the game are the 
marks and colors on the pictorial surface. When looking at the picture, however, 
we don’t merely pretend that Italy is a boot with Crotone on its arch, i.e., we 
don’t merely play the content oriented game of make- believe. We also engage 
in a prop oriented game of make- believe (which we call ‘metaphor’) in which 
it is fictionally true that Crotone is on the arch of the Italian boot if and only if 
Crotone has a certain location in the real world (MB2). The prop oriented game 
is triggered by the marks and colors depicting Italy as a boot. The direction of 
this second, prop oriented game is indicated by the second arrow. The Italian 
geography (which includes the real world location of Crotone) is the prop in 
this second game of make- believe, and the real world location of Crotone is the 
information conveyed by the metaphorical picture. So we have two games of 
make- believe: depiction and metaphor; the prop of the depiction are certain con-
figurations of marks and colors on a two- dimensional surface (a picture) and 
its content is that Italy is a boot and Crotone is on the arch of the Italian boot; 
the prop of the metaphor is the Italian peninsula and its content is that Italy is a 
boot and that Crotone is on the arch of the Italian boot. So metaphor and depic-
tion share the same content.7 They both require us to imagine the same things, 
but for different reasons: the depiction depicts Italy in a certain way, while the 
metaphor asks us to pretend Italy is that way on condition that some facts about 
Italy’s geography really obtain.
3.
In the previous section we have argued that depicted metaphors work like lin-
guistic metaphors. In what follows we will argue that certain caricatures are a 
kind of depicted metaphors. Caricatures, like metaphors— we submit— engage 
us in games of prop oriented make- believe. More precisely, as we shall explain, 
we believe that certain caricatures work like metaphors, while other caricatures 
work like hyperboles, and that caricatures of both kinds engage us in games of 
prop oriented make- believe.
7. Our choice to depart from Walton’s view on depiction made it possible for us to claim that 
the contents of the two games of make- believe are identical (see the discussion of this point in 
Section 2 above). As a referee from this journal pointed out, in order to stick to Walton’s proposal 
it should instead be argued that the contents of the two games of make- believe involved in the 
metaphorical depiction of Italy as a boot are not the same, although they are systematically related: 
the content of the content oriented game of make- believe is that the subject is having a visual ex-
perience of Italy as a boot with Crotone on its arch, while the content of the prop oriented game of 
make- believe is that Italy is a boot with Crotone on its arch.
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Suppose that we look at a picture of a strange monkey, that looks a lot like 
a monkey (it has the feet, legs, arms, hands of a monkey, as well as its ears and 
snout), but also looks like a human being, since it is wearing a suit and has pe-
culiarly human forehead and hair (see Figure 3, a caricature by Steve Bell). If we 
know what G.W. Bush looks like, we should be able to see that the creature’s 
eyes, forehead, and hair resemble his eyes, forehead, and hair and, if we follow 
our simplified version of Walton’s view, we can say that by means of looking 
at the picture we engage in a content oriented game of pictorial make- believe 
whose content is that G.W. Bush is a monkey. The prop of this game (MB1) are 
the marks and colors on the surface of the picture, and the content of the game 
is ‘G.W. Bush is a monkey’.
Suppose the picture appears in an illustrated book for children where, sim-
ply for the sake of storytelling and without any intention of poking fun at Bush, 
it is told that Bush has become a monkey. In this case, to understand how the 
image works, all we need to do is engage in the content oriented game of make- 
Figure 3. A caricature of George W. Bush by Steve Bell. Copyright © Steve Bell 
2003 - All rights reserved.
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believe just described. What we are interested in while engaging in this game of 
make- believe is the depictive content of the picture, i.e., that Bush is a monkey.
Suppose now that the same picture is used as a caricature of G.W. Bush. Our 
thesis is that, in order to use the image as a caricature of G.W. Bush, not only we 
engage in a game of make- believe that makes it true in the fictional world that 
G.W. Bush is a monkey (MB1), but we also engage in a prop oriented game of 
make- believe (MB2), where certain intellectual or behavioral properties that can 
be attributed to Bush, the referent of the depiction, are the props (the proper-
ties at issue are those that make him appear monkey- like, such as being slow, 
dull, and clumsy). The prop oriented game (MB2) is triggered by the marks and 
colors on the surface of the picture; its content, i.e., ‘G. W. Bush is a monkey’, is 
the same content of the content oriented game we engage in while recognizing 
that the picture depicts Bush (MB1), but its props are different than that of the 
content oriented game: in MB2 the props are certain of Bush’s intellectual or 
behavioral properties, whereas in MB1 the props are marks and colors on the 
pictorial surface (the trigger of the make- believe game in MB2). While engaging 
in MB2, we are interested in how imagining Bush as a monkey can be used to 
point out certain of his intellectual or behavioral properties, which are typically 
attributed to monkeys. Given that our focus is on the props, we are confronted 
with a case of prop oriented make- believe. let us see how our general schema 
applies to Bush’s caricature (Figure 4).
As illustrated in Figure 4, we have a content oriented game of make- believe 
(MB1) where the marks and colors on the pictorial surface are the props and 
Figure 4.
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the content is that Bush is a monkey. The props of MB1 are also the triggers of a 
second game of make- believe (MB2), which has certain of G.W. Bush’s intellec-
tual or behavioral properties as props and ‘G.W. Bush is a monkey’ as content. 
MB2 is prop oriented, in that we are interested in focusing on certain properties 
of G.W. Bush while engaging in it. The prop oriented game allows us to under-
stand that the picture is not just the picture of a monkey- like G.W. Bush, but it is 
a caricature of G.W. Bush as a monkey.8
Stephen Yablo (1998; see also Walton 1993) explains how certain metaphors 
are ‘procedurally essential’: instead of being uttered by a speaker who has a 
definite message to convey, they require one to look for the appropriate prop 
oriented game of make- believe that allows one to understand the meaning of 
the metaphorical talk. For instance, while interpreting ‘Juliet is the sun’ one is 
confronted with a certain content (of a game of make- believe) and required to 
ponder what is the prop associated to such content in the game. Once singled 
out the prop which figures in the appropriate game of make- believe— and there 
might be several different games and therefore several different props that work 
in this case, e.g., Juliet’s beauty, or her vital importance for romeo— one can 
understand the meaning of the metaphorical talk, because such talk is about the 
prop. “Someone who utters S in a metaphorical vein is recommending the proj-
ect of (i) looking for games in which S is a promising move, and (ii) accepting 
the propositions that are S’s inverse images in those games under the modes of 
presentation that they provide” (Yablo 1998: 253).
It seems to us that caricatures work like Yablo’s procedurally essential meta-
phors. Consider again the G.W. Bush caricature (Figure 3). While facing such 
caricature we engage in a game of make- believe which generates the fictional 
truth ‘G.W. Bush is a monkey’, but we are also prompted to engage in a second 
game of make- believe, which is prop oriented and leads us to acknowledge that 
its props are certain of G.W. Bush’s intellectual or behavioral properties. While 
looking at the picture of G.W. Bush as a monkey (MB1), we ponder about which 
of G.W. Bush’s properties are props in the second game of make- believe (MB2), 
where we pretend that people with certain intellectual or behavioral proper-
ties are monkeys. The principles of generation of MB2 are all the instances of 
the schema: x has certain properties iff according to the fiction x is a monkey. 
The principles of generation of MB2 include as an instance: it is fictionally true 
8. There is an affinity between our account and the recognitional account of caricature 
sketched by Catharine Abell and Gregory Currie (1999): they claim that we are able to “conclude 
that . . . [a] caricature depicts person X not on the basis of any X- identifying feature of the picture, 
but on the basis of some X- identifying feature of what the picture depicts” (1999: 439). This is akin 
to our claim that we are capable of understanding that a certain picture is the caricature of a certain 
subject not in virtue of the content of the game of make- believe we engage in while looking at such 
caricature (MB1), but rather in virtue of the prop oriented game of make- believe (MB2) we engage 
in while looking at it (i.e., in virtue of features of the caricatured subject).
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in MB2 that Bush is a monkey if and only if Bush has certain intellectual or be-
havioral properties. representing Bush as a monkey, i.e., pretending that he is 
a monkey, then, conveys to players engaged in MB2 the message that Bush has 
certain intellectual or behavioral properties (e.g., being slow, dull, and clumsy): 
this message is what we call ‘the real content’ of the caricature.
When Figure 3 is used as a caricature of G.W. Bush, what is fictionally true 
(i.e., that G.W. Bush is a monkey) is used to point out certain properties of G.W. 
Bush. The picture introduces us to a game of make- believe in which we are to 
imagine of people with such intellectual or behavioral properties that they are 
monkeys. By doing so, we focus on the properties of G.W. Bush that make it fic-
tionally true that he is a monkey. Although the picture is not visually accurate, 
it is metaphorically accurate: the literal content of the metaphor (that Bush is a 
monkey) is not true, but the real content of the metaphor (that Bush has certain 
monkey- like intellectual or behavioral properties) might be.9
4.
One could think that caricatures, in general, are visually inaccurate, but convey 
correct information about non- visual aspects of the subjects they represent. As 
we shall argue, however, hyperbole- like caricatures are capable of conveying 
correct information about the visual aspects of the subjects they represent, albeit 
in a peculiar way. Hyperbolic talk resembles certain caricatures in that they both 
9. Our view is compatible with the account of the ‘epistemic abuse and misuse of pictorial 
caricature’ recently offered by Christy MagUidhir (2013). MagUidhir’s proposal can be summed 
up as follows. He considers four claims: (a) editorial cartoons are capable of informing like edito-
rial writing; (b) pictorial caricatures can be revelatory about the nature of their subjects; (c) cari-
catures have persuasive power; (d) a caricature has a “unique ability to exploit the powerful and 
pervasive cognitive biases of its audience” (2013: 137). He argues that (c) is true, but its truth is 
grounded in (d), rather than being grounded in (b), from which it follows that (a) is false. More-
over, he generalizes the claim about (a) to “any medium substantially employing caricature . . . 
in service to some epistemic uptake [arguing that any such medium] is thereby to that extent an 
epistemically defective medium” (2013: 138). none of this impinges on the truth of (b) (see Ma-
gUidhir 2013: 145). With reference to MagUidhir’s account, our proposal can be said to revolve 
uniquely around claim (b). We are interested in explaining how pictorial caricatures can be revela-
tory about the nature of their subjects and we argue that this is because they engage us in prop 
oriented games of make- believe. This fact about caricature is compatible with their capability of 
engaging us, at the same time, in content oriented games of make- believe as well. In the fictional 
games prompted by caricatures, the content of the games is not epistemically reliable, for the rea-
sons explained by MagUidhir— but the reason why we are able, in the first place, to understand 
that certain pictures are caricatures, rather than, for instance, non- intentional misrepresentations, 
or lifelike pictures, is that we engage not only in content oriented, but also in prop oriented games 
of make- believe while looking at them.
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involve an exaggeration of the truth— and exaggerating the truth might be a way 
to convey correct information.10
We will first argue that hyperbolic talk, just like figurative talk, can be un-
derstood as involving engagement in a form of prop oriented make- believe. We 
will also point out that just as our previous example of a caricature can be under-
stood as a depicted metaphor, other caricatures can be understood as depicted 
hyperboles. Following our idea to treat the linguistic and the pictorial case alike, 
we will then submit that hyperbolic caricatures, just like their linguistic counter-
parts, can be understood as involving prop oriented make- believe.
Walton’s (1993) proposal is to understand the utterance of some metaphori-
cal statements as moves in a prop oriented make- believe game. We submit that 
also some hyperbolic statements can be understood as moves in prop oriented 
make- believe games of a certain kind: “games where the truth of a part licens-
es us in pretending the whole” (Yablo 2014: 199). “Games of this type” Yablo 
explains “have players in a broad sense exaggerating— saying more than they 
mean— so let’s call them hyperbolic” (2014: 199). These games employ a “booster 
device [B]” (2014: 191); in a hyperbolic game “X makes it fictional that Y just if 
Y follows from X&B” (2014: 191). Here is an example of how a hyperbolic game 
might work. The game G might have the following booster device B: if something 
moves very fast for ordinary standards, it moves at the speed of light. B makes it 
fictional that John moves at the speed of light on condition that John moves very 
fast. The booster device might be interpreted as a generation principle:
(G) ‘x moves at the speed of light’ is fictionally true iff x moves very fast.
This example shows that hyperbolic games have the form of games of make- 
believe: they specify what is fictional as a function of how the world is. What is 
assertable when speaking hyperbolically coincides with what is fictional accord-
ing to a hyperbolic game like G. When uttering the hyperbolic statement ‘John 
moves at the speed of light’ as a move in the hyperbolic game G our focus is on 
the real- world situation, i.e., the prop, that makes it fictional that John moves 
at the speed of light, i.e., John’s ability to move really fast. Understanding the 
hyperbolic statement ‘John moves at the speed of light’ involves engaging in a 
prop oriented game of make- believe which is triggered by such sentence, whose 
content is the proposition that John moves at the speed of light, and whose prop 
is John’s ability to move really fast.
Just as some caricatures can be understood as depicted metaphors, other car-
10. For a recent account of hyperbole and meiosis as figures of speech see Kendall Walton 
(2015).
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icatures can be understood as depicted hyperboles. If we combine the idea that 
some caricatures can be understood as depicted hyperboles with the idea that 
hyperbolic statements resemble metaphors in that they involve prop oriented 
make- believe, we can understand depicted hyperboles as involving some form 
of prop oriented make- believe.
To portray somebody as having a giant mouth and enormous ears (see Fig-
ure 5, a caricature by Jan Op De Beek) might be a way to point out a real aspect of 
such person’s face— among others (note that Figure 5 also conveys the metaphor 
that Obama has a big mouth). let us apply once more our schema to analyze 
how this image works (Figure 6).
Here we have a content oriented game of make- believe (MB1) where the 
marks and colors on the pictorial surface are the props and the fictional truth 
generated is ‘Obama has abnormal ears and mouth’ (this is the content of the 
game). The marks and colors on the pictorial surface also trigger a second game 
of make- believe (MB2), where the prop is Obama’s face, and the content is the 
Figure 5. A caricature of Barack Obama by Jan Op De Beek. Copyright Jan Op 
De Beek.
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same as in the first game: ‘Obama has abnormal ears and mouth’. By means of 
engaging in MB2 we grasp the fact that Figure 5 is not a mere misrepresentation 
of Obama, but rather a caricature of Obama and a quite vivid representation of 
him, in a sense.
5.
To conclude, the idea of considering caricatures as a case of prop oriented make- 
believe seems a promising way to account for their representational power, just 
as Walton’s idea of linking metaphor and prop oriented make- believe provides 
an elegant explanation of the expressive utility of figurative language. A carica-
ture invites us to ponder what aspects of the subject it portrays are caricatured 
by it and, as a consequence, it focuses our attention on such aspects of the carica-
tured subject. In the jargon of the make- believe theory, as we argued, this means 
that caricatures engage us in games of prop oriented make- believe, where we 
seek to understand what exactly is the prop associated with the content of the 
game of make- believe at issue. A corollary of this way of looking at caricatures 
is that caricatures can be effective representations, either of non- visual aspects 
of depicted characters, or of visual aspects of them, or of both. The metaphori-
cal picture of Italy as a boot conveys accurate information about the location of 
Crotone; the caricature of G.W. Bush as a monkey conveys accurate information 
about certain intellectual or behavioral properties of G.W. Bush and the carica-
Figure 6.
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ture of Obama with huge ears and mouth conveys the accurate information that 
he has rather big ears and a rather large mouth. The accurate information is not 
conveyed by means of depictions that are faithful to the visual appearance of 
Italy, G.W. Bush, or Obama, but by means of misrepresentations that work in a 
peculiar way, i.e., as caricatures (visual metaphors or hyperboles).
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